Electricity and water are often subsidized in developing countries to increase their affordability for low-income households. Ideally, such subsidies would create sufficient demand in poor neighborhoods to encourage private investment in their infrastructure. Instead, many regions receiving large subsidies have precarious distribution networks supplying users who never pay. Using a structural model of household electricity demand in Colombia, I predict the change in consumption and profits from upgrading low-quality electricity connections. I show that the existing subsidies, which provide greater transfers to areas with unreliable supply, deter investment to modernize infrastructure. Finally, I analyze alternative programs with stronger investment incentives. JEL: O13, Q41, L94
countries. 3 Dinkelman (2011) shows that a rural electrification program in South Africa led to an increase in female employment, plausibly as the result of labor-saving technology used for home production activities. 4 Lipscomb, Mobarak and Barham (2013) use exogenous variation in electrification in Brazil between 1960 and 2000, and  show that access to electricity had large positive effects on education and labor force outcomes. Rud (2012) studies the effect of electrification on manufacturing output in India, using groundwater availability as an instrument for investment in electricity infrastructure.
The contribution of this paper is to characterize the persistence of low-quality infrastructure as a dysfunctional outcome involving households, utility firms, and government. Households with informal connections receive low-quality service for which they do not pay. Utility firms tolerate non-payment because they receive financial support from the government covering the cost of service. The government provides these payments to retain the political support of the poor households and avoid civil unrest should the firm disconnect areas with many non-paying users.
However, the financial transfers by the government to utilities have a dramatic effect on investment incentives. Because the government cannot observe the consumption of households with informal connections, firms may receive fiscal transfers greater than the cost of providing service. The resulting high profits from low-quality service mean that the incremental profit from improving service is lower than the capital cost, even if such an upgrade means that payment by households can subsequently be enforced. Although the finding that subsidies create distortions is not unexpected, the particular mechanism described in this paper is novel. A subsidy program for short-term consumption instead displaces long-term investment. Based on the results in the literature about the long-term benefits of infrastructure investment, the potential welfare costs of this distortion are very large.
In this paper I use detailed household and firm data from Colombia to demonstrate the incentive effects of one such transfer program. This requires an analysis of how an upgrade affects the consumption of households with informal connections. There are three major changes for households from the provision of a modernized connection. First, installation of a meter means that the household is billed for its true usage, so it faces a non-zero marginal price for consumption. Second, a connection built to a high technical standard will improve the reliability and quality of the household's utility supply. Finally, an individual connection to the distribution network enables the firm to disconnect for non-payment and makes it much more likely that the household will pay.
These changes as the result of an upgrade induce two opposing effects on electricity consumption: an increase in marginal price due to metering reduces the quantity demanded, and an increase in reliability rotates out the household's demand. To characterize these effects, I estimate a model of household electricity demand using data for a large sample of metered households in Colombia. I rely on data from metered households because consumption patterns of unmetered households are unobservable. Nevertheless, there are many households in my sample with similar demographic characteristics to unmetered households. I use a data set that combines household electricity billing data, household characteristics including appliance holdings and demographics, and data on the number and length of electricity outages. The model accounts for the non-linearity in the price schedules due to electricity subsidies, and allows for price, income, and reliability effects that differ across households depending on their appliance holdings.
I then use the model estimates to predict the consumption of unmetered households from 100 counties in Colombia with the least reliable electricity supply. I observe the characteristics of households and the typical number and duration of outages from each county. Based on these inputs, I predict the electricity consumption of each household using the estimates of preferences. I then predict the consumption of each household after a hypothetical upgrade of the distribution network that reduces the number and length of outages and increases the household's marginal price to the regulated price schedule.
The predicted consumption of households before and after an upgrade is combined with cost and regulatory data for each firm to estimate the change in the firm's profit as a result of the upgrade. I show that for all but one of the counties in the sample, it would be more profitable for the firm not to upgrade its network, and instead maintain existing low-quality service to informal settlements. This is true even though payment rates are assumed to increase from 0 to 100 percent as a result of the upgrade. Household electricity consumption is lower after the upgrade, because the increase in consumption as a result of the improved quality is more than offset by the reduction in consumption from the higher marginal price. The upgrade also results in the firm losing large subsidy payments from the government. The capital cost of the upgrade and the reduction in subsidies more than offset the increase in revenue from user payments, resulting in the upgrade being unprofitable for most counties.
Variation across counties in the profitability of an upgrade is the result of differences in household characteristics (in particular, appliance ownership rates), differences in electricity prices and subsidy levels across regions, and differences in the existing level of network reliability.
Finally, I analyze alternative subsidy programs that may provide stronger incentives for electricity suppliers to invest in network modernization. I compute the optimal combination of several different policies under various political constraints that the government might face in changing the existing program. For example, if there are no constraints on reducing the existing value of firms, then all counties could be upgraded at a total cost to the government 33 percent less than the current program. Alternatively, if firms cannot be made worse off, then all counties could be upgraded at a total cost to the government 24 percent less than the existing program.
The major result of this paper is that government policies to maintain service for nonpaying, unmetered households may perpetuate the existence of low-quality connections by creating a disincentive for firms to invest. The prerequisites for this result-quantity-based subsidies, low-quality infrastructure, unmetered and non-paying users-are common in the infrastructure sectors of most developing countries. The particular problem in Colombia arises from two features of the subsidy program that are otherwise regarded as very successful: the targeting of subsidies to poor households, and the provision of an external funding mechanism for the subsidies. 5 Larger transfers from the government to firms supplying households with low-quality service reduce the incentive for these firms to undertake investments that potentially result in the loss of these transfers. This problem is not unique to the electricity sector in Colombia. Similar incentive problems have arisen in other countries with subsidy programs for informal settlements. 6,7 5 In terms of the allocation of government resources across households, the Colombian utility subsidy program is one of the most successful of any developing country at targeting subsidies to poor households. Komives et al. (2005) review the targeting performance of water and electricity subsidy schemes in many developing countries. They show that the Colombian scheme outperforms quantity-based subsidies in other countries that do not use any form of administrative selection of subsidy recipients. These other schemes are almost always regressive: both because many poor households do not have an electricity connection, and those with a connection use less electricity than rich households. 6 The Blackout Reduction Program ("PRA") was a subsidy program in the Dominican Republic in which the government paid 75 percent of the cost of electricity used in informal settlements. Krishnaswamy and Stuggins (2007) describe how this created incentives for firms to expand the number of households included in the program. By the end of 2004, it covered one third of the electricity customers in the country. The PRA was originally intended to be a two-year program with a cost of US$30 million per year-however, in 2004 the cost was US$226 million. The program was canceled in July 2009. 7 Singh et al. (1993) describe a "low-level equilibrium trap" for water supply in rural Kerala, India, in which the water authority provides an unreliable free service funded by the central government. They use contingent valuation to analyze the willingness-to-pay for upgraded service. Olmstead (2004) uses data for colonias in Texas border counties to show that, in the absence of universal service requirements, regulation This paper complements the previous literature that focuses on the effects of infrastructure on economic development. The results from this literature suggest that the long-term benefits of improved infrastructure are complex and far-reaching, and could not reasonably be captured by standard welfare calculations. Therefore, in this paper I do not attempt to calculate the welfare benefits from provision of more reliable electricity. Instead, I assume that the goal of government policy for informal settlements is (or arguably should be) the provision of a metered connection built to a high technical standard for all households. The major contribution of this paper is to show how regulatory design-in particular, the pricing and subsidy policy-plays an essential role in determining whether this goal is achieved.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides brief background information on the Colombian electricity market and subsidy programs. Section 2 describes the model of household demand for electricity, the data that will be used to estimate this model, the econometric methodology, and the results of the demand estimation. Section 3 uses the demand estimates, along with firm-level cost and regulatory data, to show how the current subsidy program discourages firms from upgrading the informal connections to their networks, and how alternative policies would increase the number of upgraded counties. Section 4 concludes.
Institutional Setting
In Colombia, 34 firms provide combined distribution and retail services to residential and small commercial users, with each of the distributors being a monopoly in its geographical service area. 8 The Energy and Gas Regulatory Commission ("CREG", for its initials in Spanish) sets a regulated base price for each firm f and period t, P f t . This regulated price applies to residential and small commercial users (with demand less than 2 MW). The price has components corresponding to the four segments of the electricity industry. Transmission, distribution, and retailing charges are determined by the regulator, and in most cases these are revised once every five years. 9 The generation charge is calculated based on the average price of wholesale electricity purchases-both spot and contract-over the previous twelve months. 10 of water rates can deter investment to provide service to poor communities. 8 In the electricity supply industry, the distribution segment is the provision of the physical infrastructure (such as transformers and power lines) for local delivery of electricity to end users. The retail segment is the metering and billing of end users, and the settlement of electricity purchases in the wholesale market.
9 This paper considers the firm's decision to upgrade a small part of its network. I assume throughout that the effect of the firm's decision on its overall profit is sufficiently small that the firm does not consider potential feedback from the upgrade to future values of the regulated price P f t . 10 CREG (1997), Resolution 31, Appendix 1.
For the firm, the marginal cost of supplying a unit of electricity, c f t , is the wholesale cost of electricity, which comprises the wholesale generation price and transmission charges. The firm must buy more electricity than the end user consumes because of the physical losses in the distribution network. The regulator sets a target rate for these line losses and, in the calculation of P f t , wholesale costs are scaled up by this target amount. 11 Other costs for the distribution and retail firm-capital, maintenance, billing, customer service, administration-are fixed and do not vary with usage. Nevertheless, all of these costs are recovered through the per-unit price P f t because there are no fixed monthly charges.
Most users do not pay the base price P f t . Commercial users and wealthy households pay 120 percent of P f t for their entire consumption, with the additional 20 percent being used as a contribution to a subsidy program for poor households. 12 The poor households pay either 50 percent, 60 percent or 85 percent of P f t for the first Q sub units of consumption, and then pay P f t for all additional units. 13 Compared to quantity-based subsidy programs in other countries, the Colombian program performs well at targeting benefits to poorer households. There is a universal geographical classification of all neighborhoods into six socioeconomic strata (estratos). This classification is the responsibility of local government authorities. The criteria are based on external characteristics of the dwellings and the overall quality of the urban environment, and do not depend on household characteristics such as income. For example, a house in Stratum 1 might be an unfinished wooden shack in an area without paved roads, or situated close to a refuse dump. A dwelling in Stratum 6 might be a luxury apartment or a mansion in a gated neighborhood. 14 Households classified in Strata 1, 2 and 3 receive the 50 percent, 40 percent and 15 percent subsidy respectively, while households in Strata 5 and 6 (less than 5 percent of all households) pay the 20 percent contribution. Households in Strata 4 pay P f t 11 The true level of line losses in the distribution network is unobserved. If all electricity users are metered, then line losses can be determined as the difference between the metered consumption and the injections into the network from the high voltage transmission network. However, if some users are unmetered, it is impossible to distinguish their unmetered consumption from the physical line losses.
12 Since 2012, industrial users have been exempt from the requirement to pay this contribution (Law 1430 of 2010).
13 Before August 2004, the size of the subsidized block (Q sub ) was 200 kWh/month for all subsidized users. This was reduced over three years to 130 kWh/month for users in highland regions (1000 meters or more above sea level) and 173 kWh/month for users in lowland regions. For users with informal connections, Q sub is larger: 184 kWh/month and 138 kWh/month in lowland and highland regions respectively.
14 Because it is the dwelling that is classified, and not the residents of the dwelling, a rich family could move to a house in a poor neighborhood and receive subsidized public utilities and other government benefits that are linked to the stratification program. There is considerable policy debate within Colombia on how to improve the targeting of the public utility subsidy program (Melendez, Casas and Medina (2004) , Departamento Administrativo de Planeación (2008)). A separate issue is the linking of subsidies to the geographical location of the dwelling. Medina and Morales (2007) provide evidence for Bogotá that most of these subsidy benefits are capitalized into housing prices.
for their entire consumption. Figure 1 shows the Stratum 1 price schedule, in a region with a low base price (Medellín) and a region with a high base price (Arauca). The maximum amount of the subsidy is more than twice as large in Arauca as in Medellín ($12.98 versus $5.85), for two reasons. First, the subsidy is calculated as a fraction (50 percent) of P f t , and P f t is 6 cents/kWh higher in Arauca than in Medellín. Second, the subsidized quantity Q sub is 173 kWh in Arauca compared to 130 kWh in Medellín. Because the variable costs are similar in both regions, the subsidy covers 138 percent of variable costs in Arauca but only 62 percent of variable costs in Medellín, for a household consuming 200 kWh per month. That is, in areas with a high base price such as Arauca, the Stratum 1 subsidy is sufficient to cover variable costs and contribute to fixed costs and profit, even if the household does not pay their bill.
The Ministry of Mines and Energy operates a redistribution fund to rebalance the contributions and subsidies across different retailers. At a national level, total subsidies exceeded total contributions by 46 percent in 2008. The central government makes up this difference through a contribution to the redistribution fund. Every quarter, firms report the total amount billed to customers in each category, as well as the total subsidies and contributions by category. Based on the difference between reported subsidies and contributions, the firm either pays or receives a transfer to or from the government.
The quality of electricity service in most metropolitan areas in Colombia is comparable to that in developed countries. However, for a minority of poor households in Colombia, the electricity supply is still unreliable, with frequent outages and low power quality. Households living in informal settlements on the periphery of towns and cities have the lowest quality service. Due to the absence of a planned network in these areas, households construct their own improvised connections to the nearest distribution grid. The Colombian government has implemented several policies to address the problem of these informal connections. First, households in informal settlements were brought into the targeted subsidy program at the Stratum 1 level of subsidy. 15 Second, a program known as the Social Energy Fund ("FOES") was implemented to provide additional subsidies to vulnerable areas including informal urban settlements. Finally, the government implemented a program in which it chooses, funds and manages the upgrade of local distribution networks-the Normalization Program for Electrical Networks ("PRONE"). 16 One characteristic of households in informal settlements is that they typically lack an individual meter. Estimation of consumption for unmetered users is regulated by CREG (1997) Resolution 108, which concerns the retailing and billing of electricity and gas. For unmetered households in informal settlements, Article 34 of this resolution states that firms should calculate consumption based on the mean consumption in the previous six months of metered users in the stratum that predominates in the sector where the user is located. For users connected to a collective meter, Article 33 states that individual users should be billed for total metered consumption divided by the number of users. 17 The regulations provide flexibility for firms to set the parameters and choose the methodology for estimating the consumption of unmetered households. 18
Household Demand for Electricity
In this section I describe the model of household demand for electricity, the data set constructed to estimate the model, the econometric methodology used for the estimation, and the estimation results. The demand model builds on that of Reiss and White (2005) , with the addition of supply outages. This model incorporates the non-linearity in the price schedule described in Section 1, the heterogeneity across households in characteristics and appliance holdings, and the effect of reliability on electricity demand. All of these components are used for the empirical application in Section 3, in which I use the model estimates to simulate electricity consumption before and after a hypothetical network upgrade.
Model
People do not consume electricity directly. Instead, the demand for electricity is derived from the demand for the services provided by each of the devices in the home that consume electricity. For example, a television consumes approximately 0.2 kWh of electricity per hour. The household decides how many hours of television to watch, recognizing the price of their viewing hours which includes the television's consumption of electricity. A similar decision is made by the household for each of the appliances in the home. The total electricity consumption is the sum of the device-level consumption across all appliances.
The electricity consumption of appliance i in household j during a month t with no supply interruptions, q * ijt , is given by equation (2.1).
Variable y jt is the income of household j in month t, and coefficient γ i measures the effect of income on the electricity consumption of appliance i. 19 p jt = p jt (q jt ) is the marginal price of electricity consumption faced by household j during month t. This price is a function of the total household electricity consumption in that period, q jt , due to the possible non-linearity in the price schedule. 20 Coefficient β i captures the appliance-level response to changes in this marginal price. 21 The vector z jt is a vector of household characteristics for household j in month t. The coefficient vector δ i measures the effect of these characteristics on appliancelevel demand. Finally, η ijt is an appliance, household and month specific error term that reflects unobservable household characteristics that affect the electricity consumption of appliance i of household j in month t.
In practice, the household may face unpredictable interruptions to electricity supply during the period. Figure 2 illustrates the effect of these interruptions on the appliance-level consumption of electricity. The line q * (p) represents the appliance-level demand without interruptions from equation (2.1), with quantity normalized to an hourly average. For a fraction (1 − w) of hours in the month, supply is uninterrupted and represented by S 1 (p): at any regulated price, the household can consume electricity up to the capacity of its connection. For the remaining fraction w of hours in the month, supply is interrupted (S 2 (p)) and electricity consumption is zero. If outages occur randomly, so that both high-value and low-value consumption of electricity is interrupted, then the effective supply-constrained appliance-level demand is (1 − w)q * (p). 22 19 As shown below in equation (2.4), income y jt is adjusted for the non-linearity of the price schedule. 20 The inclusion of price in the demand equation presupposes that the household pays for their consumption of electricity. However, particularly in a developing country, a significant minority of households do not pay for their billed consumption. In this paper, I do not model the household's decision to pay or not to pay their electricity bill, and instead treat this as exogenously determined by the quality of the household's infrastructure. Households without an individual meter have a marginal price of zero, regardless of whether or not they pay their bill. Households with an individual connection and meter are assumed to pay their bill in order to avoid disconnection. 21 There are two reasons for using the linear specification for demand instead of a log-log or log-linear model. First, price enters linearly in order to allow for a price of zero, which is required for the empirical application. Second, quantity is linear because the total consumption is modeled as the sum of the individual appliance-level consumptions.
22 This model of outages corresponds to the intermittent supply framework, one of three theoretical frameworks that Klytchnikova and Lokshin (2009) describe for analyzing infrastructure outages. An alternative
The above discussion assumes that electricity consumption by the appliance is constant for all hours of the month. However, most activities that use electricity take place at irregular intervals. Depending on the particular appliance, it may be possible to reschedule an activity that would have occurred during a supply interruption. 23 This would reduce the overall effect of supply reliability on monthly electricity consumption for the appliance. For example, television watching or meal preparation may be difficult or impossible to reschedule, so a power outage during these activities may have a large impact on their electricity usage. Conversely, thermal storage appliances such as refrigerators or air conditioners might run longer after a power outage in order to restore the set temperature, so the overall effect of outages on their electricity usage may be small.
The extent to which it is possible to reschedule usage of an appliance i in the event of an outage is captured by the term θ i , a scale factor on the outage frequency w. If all usage of appliance i can be rescheduled in the event of an outage, θ i would be equal to 0. The electricity consumption of appliance i in household j during month t, incorporating the effect of supply interruptions and rescheduling, is given by equation
The total electricity consumption of household j in period t, q jt , is given by equation (2.3).
The variable A ijt is an indicator that is equal to 1 if household j owns an appliance of type i in period t. There are M individual appliances modeled, including a "baseload" category approach would be to assume efficient rationing of electricity in which the supply restriction affects the units with the lowest willingness-to-pay (Davis and Kilian, 2011). This would be the case if outages were scheduled to occur at the times when usage is least valuable. However, when outages are random, both high-value and low-value consumption will be affected, causing the whole demand curve to rotate. 23 Munasinghe (1980) distinguishes the use of electricity for production activities in the household, which can be rescheduled, from the use of electricity for leisure activities, which cannot be rescheduled. As a result the principal cost of power outages for residential users is the loss of leisure.
24 Another effect of reliability on household electricity demand is through the decision to buy electrical appliances. Frequent outages may damage sensitive appliances or reduce the flow of benefits that the household will enjoy from the appliance. In this paper, because data on appliance prices are not available, I model electricity demand conditional on the appliance holdings of each household, and do not separately model the appliance purchase decision. This approach has been widely used for the analysis of household electricity demand, starting with Parti and Parti (1980) . for every household that incorporates lighting and small appliances.
The non-linearity in the price schedule is modeled using the discrete-continuous choice framework in which each observation of the household's consumption is the result of the household choosing one of the three segments of the price schedule: the first step, the second step, or the kink point Q sub . If the household chooses to consume on the first step of the price schedule, then it faces a marginal price of p L jt . If the household chooses to consume on the second step of the price schedule, then it faces a marginal price of p H jt . However, in this case, the household pays the lower price p L jt for the first Q sub units. This reduced price for the inframarginal units is treated as a transfer to the household and incorporated through the income variable, as in equation (2.4).
Equation (2.3) includes an additional error term, ε jt . This term allows for potential differences between the household's choice of where to locate on the price schedule and the observed consumption of the household. The term ε jt has been described as measurement error (Moffitt, 1986), optimization error, or perception error (Hewitt and Hanemann, 1995) . Without this term, the model would predict extreme bunching of households at the kink point in the price schedule (MaCurdy, Green and Paarsch, 1990 ). Such bunching is not observed in the data.
Data
The data collated for this investigation provides a rich environment for the analysis of household demand for electricity in a developing country. It incorporates all of the important determinants of electricity demand described in Section 2.1: the non-linear price schedule, appliance holdings, and service reliability. Monthly electricity billing data is matched at a household level to cross-section data on households including appliance holdings and dwelling characteristics. These data are also combined with network information on monthly transformer-level outages.
Microdata on household characteristics are from the 2005 Amplified (Long-Form) Census, undertaken by the National Statistical Department ("DANE") over a 10-month period between May 2005 and March 2006. The census microdata were matched to billing data identification codes from a listing of residential electricity bill recipients in Colombia in March 2004. For the matched households, I obtained their monthly electricity bills over the six-year period January 2003 to December 2008. These billing data include information on the start and end of the billing cycle, the billed consumption, the meter and connection type, any subsidy or contribution amounts, and the total charge. 25 In addition, the billing data was matched to a database containing monthly information on all service transformers in Colombia. The transformers are the final stages of the local distribution networks, in which the voltage is stepped down to the level at which it can be used by households. Since the losses when transmitting electricity at such low voltages are very large relative to high voltage transmission, these service transformers are generally located within a few hundred meters of the end user. The transformer database includes information on location, capacity, number of users, and the number and total length of outages for that transformer and month, in each of five categories (planned, unplanned, minor, force majeure and others). The outage information in the transformer data is consistent with subjective reports by households about the quality of their electricity supply. 26 The advantages of the transformer data compared to the survey data are the much greater precision in the reliability measures, the near-complete coverage of all electricity users in Colombia, and availability of the information on a monthly basis.
A important component of the analysis is the estimation of the price and quality effects because these will be used for out-of-sample prediction of consumption in low-quality areas. The two major sources of identification for the price effect are the variation across households in the price schedule (due to differences in the regulated price across strata and markets) and variation in the marginal price for a single household depending on their consumption quantity. Figure 3 shows the variation in the marginal price for the observations in the sample: from 4 cents/kWh for Stratum 1 households with low consumption in the cheapest territory, to 16 cents/kWh for Stratum 5 and 6 households in the most expensive territory. Figure 3 also shows the variation in monthly outages (measured as the log number of outage minutes in the month) for observations in the sample. The out-of-sample analysis in Section 3 uses areas with a monthly mean outages exceeding 29 hours. Such outage lengths lie within the support of the estimation sample: 4.6 percent of the monthly observations in the estimation sample have at least this length of outages.
Empirical Strategy
There are five appliances that I model using Equation (2.2): refrigerator, washing machine, television, computer, and fan. These were selected because they are the appliances with relatively large consumption that are most commonly owned by low-income households. Seven additional appliances are not modeled individually and are instead incorporated as an indicator variable in the baseload term: blender, oven, microwave, water heater, electric shower, stereo, and air conditioner. 27 There are six heterogenous preference terms η ijt corresponding to the five appliances and the baseload consumption. H jt = (η 1jt , η 2jt , ..., η 6jt ) is assumed to be distributed as multivariate normal with mean (0, ..., 0) and variance Σ. I impose the restriction that the covariance between the baseload consumption error term and the individual appliance error terms is zero.
For any household j, the variance of η jt will depend on the appliances owned by that household. Let A jt = A 1jt . . . A 6jt , a vector of zeroes and ones, where a value of 1 corresponds to the appliances that household j owns in period t. η jt is distributed N (0, σ 2 η jt ), where:
Every possible combination of the five appliances occurs at least once in the data. In principle, this would allow estimation of variances for 32 groups, where each group is a particular combination of appliances. The more restrictive variance structure ensures that the estimated variances are consistent with the economic model of electricity demand built up from appliance-level consumption. The error term ε jt is assumed be distributed N (0, σ 2 ) and is independent of the heterogeneous preference terms in H jt . The derivation of the likelihood function based on this assumption is standard in the literature for estimation of demand models with nonlinear prices. 28 The novel feature of this paper is the expression for the variance of η jt in equation (2.5), built up from appliance-level error terms and the household appliance holdings. 29 Ap-pendix A shows how Equation (2.3), combined with these assumptions for η jt and ε jt , can be used to derive the log-likelihood function for estimation.
In theory, the outage parameter θ i may differ across appliances depending on the extent to which usage can be rescheduled after an outage. However, estimating separate θ i for each appliance is not empirically tractable. In the main specification, I restrict θ i to be the same for all appliances. 30 I also impose restrictions on preferences to ensure that exactly one of the cases in Equation (2.3) holds. These correspond to several thousand linear restrictions on γ i and β i , one for each combination of household characteristics in the data, to ensure that the income effect from the inframarginal transfer is smaller than the substitution effect from the higher price. 31 The vector of household characteristics z jt includes the number of household members and the number of rooms (both also interacted with price), an indicator variable for whether the dwelling is an apartment, the mean daily temperature at the household's location during each billing cycle, and linear and quadratic terms in the historical number and length of outages before the sample period. The historical outage terms capture the possible longterm effects of service reliability on electricity consumption that do not operate through contemporaneous supply outages. These might include the effect of outages on the quality of the household's capital stock or on electricity consumption behavior. Table 1 provides additional information on all variables that are used in estimation. I estimate the model using a balanced panel of household billing data for the six months before and six months after each household's census interview. I dropped observations with a billing cycle length shorter than 28 days or longer than 32 days, and normalized consumption and outages to a standard billing cycle length of 30 days. I also dropped observations for households with a small business in their home, households who paid a fine of more than $20 at any time in the billing data, households with a consumption greater than 1,000 kWh in any month, and households with any observations based on estimated rather than metered usage. After dropping these observations, I estimated a linear regression model of annual electricity consumption of the household on appliance holdings, household characteristics, and regional dummies. I calculated the residuals from these estimates and dropped those with likelihood-based estimation procedures, for which the theoretical prediction of extreme bunching at the kink point in the one-error model is more difficult to reconcile with the absence of such bunching in the data. 30 I estimate two alternative specifications to test the sensitivity of the results to this assumption. In the first, I fix θ i for the individual appliances to be zero and estimate θ i only for the baseload consumption. In the second, I allow θ i to be different between the baseload consumption and the individual appliances. As shown in Table 7 , both specifications give very similar results. 31 I also estimate a parsimonious specification in which price only has an effect on baseload consumption. As shown in Table 7 , this implies greater price sensitivity for Stratum 1 households and, consequently, a larger change in consumption for the counterfactual described in Section 3. observations with residuals in the top 1 or bottom 1 percentiles. 32 The total sample size after this procedure is 884,988 observations from 73,749 households.
Results
In this section, I describe the estimation results for the structural model of household demand presented above, and interpret the preference parameters in terms of the price and income elasticities of demand, the relationship between outages and electricity demand, and appliance-level consumption. The summary results presented in this section are only for descriptive purposes. The analysis of firm incentives in Section 3 is built up from householdlevel preferences and characteristics rather than the aggregate summary statistics. Table 2 shows the parameter estimates from the maximum likelihood estimation. The dependent variable is the monthly electricity consumption for a household in kWh. All results in the table are from a single estimation procedure: each column represents the interaction effects for the individual appliances that the household owns. Small appliance, month-of-year and eight region indicator variables are also included in the regression but their coefficients are not reported. Table 2 reports the estimated value of σ (45.0 kWh/month) and the appliance-level σ η i . For any particular household, their value of σ η jt is given by equation 2.5 and depends on the household's appliance holdings and the estimated covariance matrix Σ. Table 3 reports the estimated correlation matrix for the η i . Table 4 shows the mean and median price and income elasticities of demand, for the whole sample and by stratum. The mean price elasticity is -0.34 and the mean income elasticity is 0.06. 33 Table 4 shows that the price elasticities are closest to zero for households in the lower 32 These correspond to observations of electricity consumption that are not consistent with the economic model used for this study, possibly as a result of incomplete information on the electricity demand at the address. For example, suppose there is one family living at the address, but the second floor of their dwelling is rented out as a dental surgery. If there is a single electricity bill for the family and the business, but the matched census data only includes information for the family, then the demographic and appliance information of that family will not be consistent with the electricity consumption at the address. The middle block of Table 7 shows the sensitivity of the estimation and counterfactual results to changes in the assumptions for sample construction. 33 The method for calculating these elasticities is based on Olmstead, Hanemann and Stavins (2007). First, for each observation in the sample, I draw values of jt and η jt from the estimated distribution of these unobservable terms. I use the draws of jt and η jt , combined with the observable variables and their estimated coefficients, to predict consumption using equation (2.3). Next, I increase the price at all steps on the price schedules by 1 percent, and predict consumption again using the same draws of jt and η jt but with the higher price. Finally, for each observation, I compute the price elasticity using the following formula, whereq jt is the predicted consumption value:
strata. Stratum 1 households have a mean price elasticity of -0.14, compared to households in Strata 5 and 6, who have mean price elasticities of -0.76 and -0.65, respectively. The income elasticities are also greater for households in the higher strata. The mean income elasticity for Strata 1 and 2 households is 0.06, compared to 0.10 for households in Strata 5 and 6.
The estimated price elasticities are comparable to previous research on electricity demand. Reiss and White (2005) estimate a mean price elasticity of -0.39 for their sample of Californian households, compared to the mean in this paper of -0.34. For Colombia, Maddock, Castaño and Vella (1992) apply the discrete-continuous choice method to data for Medellin, Colombia in 1986. They estimate price elasticities of -0.17 for Strata 1 and 2, -0.51 for Strata 3 and 4, and -0.79 for Strata 5 and 6. These are close to the mean elasticities from Table 4 of -0.19, -0.60 and -0.70 for these same groups. Medina and Morales (200) also estimate the demand for electricity in Colombia using the Discrete-Continuous Choice approach applied to household survey data from 2003. They obtain a mean price elasticity of -0.45. 34 In this paper, the mean income elasticity of 0.06 is much lower than the previous results for Colombia. Maddock, Castaño and Vella (1992) estimate a mean income elasticity of 0.30, and Medina and Morales (200) estimate a mean income elasticity of 0.31. However, these results are not directly comparable. The important difference between this paper and the earlier studies is that I model electricity demand at the appliance level, and the income elasticities of demand are conditional on the appliance holdings of the household. The difference in the estimates demonstrates that a large part of the effect of income on electricity demand is through the appliance purchase decision. The income elasticity result for this paper is closer to that of Reiss and White (2005) , who condition on appliance holdings and obtain a zero income elasticity.
The final two columns in Table 4 summarize the effect of one additional outage hour
The income elasticity is calculated in a similar way, increasing income by 1 percent instead of price. For the computation of Table 4 I truncated the distribution of the price elasticities at -2 and 0, and the income elasticities at -1 and 2. 34 Although the pattern of the price elasticity results is similar, there are several differences between the current paper and the previous Colombian studies. I allow for considerable heterogeneity across households in their behavioral responses, which depend, for example, on the household's income and appliance holdings. My data includes metered household consumption over several years; in comparison, Maddock, Castaño and Vella (1992) use the average consumption over three months (which may be problematic in the context of non-linear prices), and Medina and Morales (200) impute household consumption for a single month from reported expenditure on electricity and the regulated price schedules. For unmetered households, consumption imputed from expenditure data may be different to actual consumption. Finally, I use detailed information on the number and length of outages for each household and month, which allows me to estimate the effect of service reliability on demand. This richer specification is particularly important for the application in this paper to firm investment and the incentive effect of the subsidy program. on the monthly electricity consumption of households. Overall, one additional outage hour will reduce monthly electricity consumption by a mean of 0.175 kWh. This corresponds to approximately 125 percent of the hourly mean electricity consumption of households. Unsurprisingly, given their higher overall consumption, outages cause a larger absolute reduction in the electricity consumption of households in Strata 5 and 6 compared to households in Strata 1 and 2. 35 Table 5 shows predicted monthly consumption for each of 12 appliances. 36 There are two checks on the reasonableness of the predicted consumption. First, monthly mean consumption figures are converted to an approximate number of hours per day that the appliance is used. 37 The second check on appliance-level consumption is to compare with estimates for the United States by the Energy Information Administration. In most cases the estimates are similar, or differ for obvious reasons such as climate. 38
Firm Investment in Infrastructure Upgrades
In this section, I use the estimates of household preferences for electricity consumption from Section 2 to analyze the distribution firm's decision to upgrade the quality of its infrastructure in informal settlements. This upgrade includes improvements to the local distribution network as well as the installation of individual metered connections to each household. The structural model of household electricity demand in Section 2 is essential for calculating the benefits of an upgrade for the firm. The lack of electricity meters means that consumption before the upgrade is not observed. I use the demand model to predict household electricity consumption before the upgrade, assuming a zero marginal price and unreliable service. Furthermore, the counterfactual consumption of households after the upgrade is not observed. I use the demand model to predict consumption after the upgrade, assuming households then face the regulated price schedule and receive more reliable service. The predicted consumption before and after the upgrade is used to calculate the firm's profit before and after the upgrade, and so determines the firm's investment decision.
Illustrative Model
The infrastructure upgrade comprises three technical components:
1. improvements to the local distribution network, such as the construction of power lines built to a high technical standard and the installation of higher-capacity transformers;
2. the installation of an individual connection from the distribution network to each customer's dwelling; and
3. the installation of a meter at the entry point to the customer's dwelling. 39
For the customer, an important effect of the upgrade is that the marginal price of electricity increases from zero to a positive price on the regulated price schedule. Before the upgrade, the electricity usage of an individual household is not measured, so an additional unit of consumption has no effect on the amount that the household pays. This is true even if the household receives a bill based on estimated usage and regardless of whether they pay the bill or not. As long as there is no connection between actual consumption and the amount the household pays, the marginal price of additional consumption for the household is zero, and the household will consume at a price of zero on their demand curve. The major benefit to customers of the upgrade is the reduction in the frequency and duration of electricity outages. These outages are stochastic events caused by the failure of poorly maintained and overloaded equipment, as well as environmental factors such as trees, animals, storms, and lightning (Pabla, 2005) . Both the improvements to the distribution network and the installation of individual connections reduce the probability of outages. The individual connections enable the firm to control the number of users and their total demand on each branch of its distribution network, reducing the probability that customer load exceeds the capacity of the network equipment.
The individual connections also facilitate the collection of payment from each household. Before the upgrade, it may be difficult or impossible to disconnect non-paying households who 39 The combination of these three components is defined as "normalization" of informal settlements for the government program PRONE, described in Section 1 (Decree 3735 of 2003, Article 3). In addition to physical investment by utility firms, normalization also requires formal recognition of the settlement by municipal authorities. Feler and Henderson (2011) describe strategic withholding of formalized water service by local authorities in Brazil in order to limit in-migration. In this analysis I focus solely on the profit incentive of utility firms.
receive electricity through unauthorized connections to their neighbors or the network. The installation of meters may also affect payment enforcement. If prepaid meters are installed, then all electricity is paid for before it is used. Even without prepaid meters, customers with low usage may be more willing to pay for their consumption if it is correctly measured. 40 The three components of the upgrade have several effects on the firm's profitability. The interaction of these effects determines whether investment in the upgrade is worthwhile for the firm. First, the upgrade will change the consumption of electricity. From Equation (2.2), it will rotate outwards the effective demand for electricity (due to the improved reliability) but also cause a shift back along the demand curve (due to the increase in the marginal price from zero to some positive level). The relative size of these two opposing effects will differ for each firm and household, based on the estimation results reported in Section 2. Second, as described above, the upgrade provides the firm with the ability to collect payment from households. Finally, the correct measurement of consumption and the reclassification of the household reduces the size of the fiscal transfer that the firm receives from the government. Figure 4 provides an illustration of the effects of an upgrade and the calculation of the change in the firm's profits. D 1 (P ) is the demand curve for an average household with unreliable service. Because consumption before the upgrade is unmetered, the marginal price of consumption is zero, so the household consumes the quantity q 1 = D 1 (0). This quantity is unobserved by the household, government, and firm. As described in Section 1, there are at least two methodologies the firm could use to estimate the unobserved consumption. For this example, I assume that the firm meters the electricity consumption of the entire settlement and bills the household for average consumption, including distribution losses between the meter and the dwelling. 41 If q 1 is the mean consumption in the settlement, then this billed consumption is q 1 /(1 − l 1 ), where l 1 measures the losses in the distribution network.
The government provides a per unit consumption subsidy of s, with total value of the subsidy based on billed consumption. Before the upgrade, the firm is assumed to be unable 40 I assume throughout this paper that the upgrade is a bundle with three components: network improvements, individual connections to households, and customer-level metering. An alternative is to analyze these investments as separate decisions by the firm. However, there are technical, legal, and economic reasons why this separation is impractical. The installation of meters without an individual connection is meaningless if there is no demarcation of the "entry point" to the dwelling. Provision of a meter may also be regarded as formal recognition of the household's connection, making the firm legally liable for any damages caused by dangerous and unreliable cables that it did not install. Conversely, upgrading the network without installing individual meters increases electricity demand, but profitability would be lower because there is no change in the firm's revenue. 41 In theory, this means that the household will face a positive marginal price (P f − s)/(N (1 − l 1 )), where N is the number of households downstream from the meter. Most of the time, N is sufficiently large that the marginal price can be treated as zero. An alternative assumption is that the firm bills the household for the mean metered quantity of households of the same stratum in the firm's distribution area (in which case the marginal price is exactly zero). I report results for both billing methodologies in Section 3.3. to enforce payment by the household, and so the household pays nothing for its billed consumption. The firm's revenue comes entirely from the subsidy transfer: area A + B + E + F + G + H. The per-unit variable cost for the firm of providing electricity is c. Total variable cost is the area A + B + E, based on total consumption including line losses. Profit for the firm before the upgrade is the region F + G + H.
After the network upgrade, the household demand rotates from D 1 (P ) to D 2 (P ) as a result of the greater reliability of service. The upgrade allows the firm to meter consumption, so the marginal price for the household is P f − s, not 0. Therefore, household consumption after the upgrade is q 2 = D 2 (P f − s). The government subsidy is now based on the billed true consumption q 2 , so the transfer from the government is the area A + F . The upgrade enables firms to enforce payment by households, who pay the area I. Total revenue for the firm is A + F + I. Variable costs are the area A + B, so profit for the firm after the upgrade is the area F + I − B.
The change in the firm's profit from this one household, as a result of the upgrade, is given by I −G−H −B. This calculation is repeated for all households in the settlement, each with different electricity demand. If the area I − G − H − B, summed over all households, is sufficiently large to cover the annualized capital cost of the upgrade, then the firm will make an investment to upgrade its network in the settlement. Otherwise, it will be more profitable for the firm to continue providing low-quality service.
Empirical Strategy
I consider the 100 counties (municipios) in Colombia with the least reliable electricity service (among those areas connected to the national transmission network). I use the characteristics of Stratum 1 households in the urban areas of each of these counties from the 2005 Census. These are combined with outage data and firm-level price and cost data.
Using the estimates from Section 2, I simulate household-level consumption in each county under two scenarios. First, I assume that the Stratum 1 households have unreliable, unmetered service, which they do not pay for. Their consumption quantity corresponds to q 1 in Figure 4 . Next, I assume that the households receive an upgraded connection, with a 75 percent reduction in outages, the installation of individual meters, and the enforcement of bill payment. The consumption quantity following the upgrade corresponds to q 2 in Figure  4 . I calculate the firm's profit before and after the upgrade. For each household, the change in profit is equivalent to the area I − G − H − B in Figure 4 . Finally, if the aggregate change in profit exceeds the annualized cost of the upgrade, the upgrade is assumed to occur.
Note that the consumption and profit calculation, before and after the upgrade, is undertaken for each individual household. Because the characteristics of households differ, there are large differences across households in their contributions to the firm's profit, even within a settlement. I aggregate the households in each county and assume the firm decides whether to invest based on the overall change in profit for the county. That is, I assume the firm is unable to select a subgroup of users within a county to be upgraded.
Appendix B provides additional details on the underlying model of distribution firms and the methodology used to analyze the profitability of upgrades.
Results
The components of the upgrade calculation are summarized in Table 6 . The first two columns show the calculation using two alternative assumptions about the calculation of the billed quantity before the upgrade. The first column corresponds to Figure 4 , in which it is assumed that the distribution company meters consumption at the entry point to the settlement and bills each household for the average consumption in the settlement, including all distribution losses between the meter and the dwellings. An alternative assumption, shown in the second column, is that the distribution company bills each household for the average billed consumption of all Stratum 1 households in its service territory.
The assumption for the first two columns in Table 6 is that no households pay their bill before the upgrade and every household pays after the upgrade. The third column shows the results for an alternative assumption about bill payment. The billed quantities are identical to the first column. However, 10 percent of the pre-upgrade households and 90 percent of the post-upgrade households pay their bill (instead of 0 and 100 percent respectively in the other columns).
Each of the first three columns shows the unweighted mean of the results for the 100 counties in the counterfactual sample. The fourth and fifth columns in Table 6 show the upgrade calculations for two individual counties: the ones with the lowest and highest profit before the upgrade. All amounts shown in the table (except for the number of upgrades) are monthly household-level means.
Before the upgrade, the mean electricity consumption of the unmetered Stratum 1 households in the 100 counties is 126 kWh/month. The upgrade has two opposite effects on the quantity demanded. The size of these effects depends on the interaction of the demand estimates with the characteristics of each household. Demand rotates out as a result of the greater reliability of service. In addition, the marginal price faced by the household increases from zero (because of the lack of a meter) to the appropriate value on the regulated nonlinear price schedule for that region. This causes a movement back along the demand curve. The second effect dominates and, as a result, mean consumption is lower after the upgrade: 120 kWh/month. The revenue of firms before the upgrade comes solely from government subsidy transfers for the amounts billed to households in informal settlements. The subsidy revenue differs across counties depending on the values of P f t and Q sub . The variable cost before the upgrade is equal to c f t on the units consumed before the upgrade, including the assumed level of line losses. The mean profit before the upgrade is $4.12 per household per month. That is, even though the households in the informal settlements do not pay for their electricity, they still make a positive contribution to profit. 42 The subsidy transfers alone more than cover the variable costs of the electricity used by households.
After the upgrade, the revenue from subsidies falls to a mean of $6.11 per household per month. One reason for this decline is that the households will no longer be eligible for the Social Energy subsidies targeted at informal settlements. A second reason is that, after the upgrade, Stratum 1 subsidies are calculated based on the household's true consumption rather than the average consumption plus line losses. The decline in subsidies is offset by the new payments from households: a mean of $6.64 per household per month. Variable costs are lower because of lower consumption and lower line losses. The average profit for the 100 counties is higher after the upgrade than before, excluding the cost of the upgrade: $6.75 per household per month compared to $4.12 per household per month.
The upgrade will take place in a county if the change in profit is sufficient to cover the capital cost of the upgrade, assumed to be slightly more than US$500 per household. For a cost of capital of 13.4 percent, the upgrade would need to increase profits of the firm by $5.65 per household per month. Therefore, the upgrade will only take place in the single county for which the change in profit exceeds $5.65. This is despite the fact that the profit after the upgrade exceeds $5.65 in most counties, so as a standalone investment (without considering the impact on existing operations) the upgrade of distribution networks in informal settlements would be profitable. Table 7 demonstrates the robustness of the results to differences in the demand specification, the estimation sample, and the counterfactual assumptions. Under a wide range of modeling assumptions the above qualitative results still hold. Consumption falls after the upgrade, and firm profits increase, but in most cases by less than the capital cost of the upgrade. The number of upgrades, for the case in which consumers are billed for mean consumption including losses, ranges from 0 to 12 out of the 100 counties. There are more upgrades for the case in which consumers are billed from mean Stratum 1 consumption, but in no specification would more than 45 out of 100 counties be upgraded under the current policy.
The reason why upgrades do not occur in the majority of counties is that the profits for firms from the existing low-quality infrastructure are sufficiently high that it is not worthwhile to invest in an upgrade. There are three reasons why these profits are high. First, because the consumption of households with informal connections is unobserved, the quantity for which they are billed (and which determines the size of the subsidy) exceeds their true consumption. Second, the Social Energy Fund subsidies are targeted only to areas with lowquality infrastructure, providing an additional revenue stream for firms serving these areas. Finally, the combination of the ordinary subsidy program and the Social Energy subsidy mean that the government subsidies exceed the variable cost of electricity, even allowing for higher losses in areas with unreliable infrastructure.
Policy Counterfactuals
Based on the above analysis, there are four general strategies the government could use to increase the number of upgraded areas: reduce the transfers to firms before the upgrade, provide additional transfers to firms after the upgrade, increase the consumption of households after the upgrade, and subsidize the cost of the upgrade. However, the government faces political constraints from firms and households on the policies that are possible to implement. In this section, I search over the space of feasible policies to find the combination that maximizes the number of upgraded households and minimizes the cost to the government.
I consider combinations of six specific policies: (1) a reduction in the Social Energy subsidy, (2) a reduction in the size of the Stratum 1 subsidy for unmetered households in informal settlements, (3) limits on the distribution losses that can be billed to households before the upgrade, (4) transfers to firms conditional on an improvement in service quality, (5) provision of free appliances to upgraded households, and (6) full or partial funding of the capital cost of the upgrade. The first three policies directly reduce the revenue of firms serving informal settlements. The fourth policy is an operating subsidy offered to firms in areas with a high number of outages, with the amount of the subsidy depending on the reduction in outages. 43 The fifth policy would shift out the demand of households receiving the appliances and increase the profit for the firm from upgrading them. 44 Finally, the capital cost or connection subsidy would reduce the hurdle for the upgrade to be profitable for firms. I search over approximately 47.8 million combinations of different levels of these six policies. 45 However, there may be political constraints on combinations of policies that can be implemented. Table 8 shows the current subsidy program (P0) and the results for the optimal program under four different objectives or sets of constraints.
Program P1 is the optimal policy combination that minimizes the cost to the government of subsidizing informal settlements. 46 Under this program, the Stratum 1 subsidy is nearly halved for counties before the upgrade, and firms are greatly restricted in the extent to which they can bill distribution losses to households with a shared meter. The government provides no contribution to the cost of the upgrade. This program would result in upgrades for 87 counties, at a total cost to the government 55 percent lower than the current program. The cost to the government is non-zero because of the subsequent provision of regular Stratum 1 subsidies for the upgraded counties. However, this program would result in the permanent disconnection of the electricity supply to 13 counties. This would occur because the profit in these counties before the upgrade is negative, and the profit after the upgrade is less than the cost of the upgrade. The social turmoil that would arise from such an outcome makes it politically impossible.
Program P2 is the optimal policy combination that maximizes the number of upgraded counties at the minimum cost to the government. This program combines a reduction in the Stratum 1 subsidy from 50 percent to 20 percent, a small reduction in the billed distribution losses, and the provision of a 35 percent subsidy for the capital costs of the upgrade. Under P2, every county would be upgraded, at a cost to the government 33 percent below the current program. The constraint on the implementation of P2 is that the average firm value falls by 25 percent. 47 If the government wishes to retain support of the utility firms, there may be a political requirement for the program to provide the same or higher value to firms as the current system of subsidies.
Program P3 maximizes the number of upgraded counties at the minimum cost to the upgrade. This makes it an expensive way for the government to provide additional revenue to firms. 45 The specific combinations that I calculate are: 21 levels of the Stratum 1 subsidy, from 0 percent to 50 percent; 21 levels of the Social Energy subsidy, from 0 cents/kWh to 2 cents/kWh; 21 levels of the proportion of losses billed before the upgrade, from 0 percent to 100 percent, 41 levels of the capital subsidy, from 0 percent to 100 percent; 21 levels of the quality subsidy, from 0 cents/kWh to 1 cent/kWh for each percentage point reduction in outages; and the provision of 5 types of appliance (none, refrigerator, fan, computer, washing machine, and television). 46 The cost to the government means the capitalized cost of the pre-upgrade subsidies for the areas that are not upgraded, plus the capitalized cost of providing post-upgrade subsidies to areas that are upgraded, plus any costs the government incurs for the upgrade. The capitalized cost is zero for the counties where the electricity supply is shut down.
47 Firm value is the capitalized pre-upgrade profit for the areas that are not upgraded, plus the capitalized post-upgrade profit for the areas that are upgraded, less the upgrade cost for the areas that are upgraded. government, with the additional constraint that firms cannot be worse off than under the status quo. P3 incorporates a higher capital subsidy, a small subsidy based on the extent of reliability improvement, and a slightly different combination of Stratum 1 subsidy and restrictions on billing distribution losses than P2. All counties would be upgraded, at a cost to the government 24 percent less than the current program.
A further problem that might arise from Programs P2 and P3 is that it would not be profitable for firms to maintain service to counties before the upgrade. This might result in firms cutting off electricity service until the upgrade is in place. 48 For example, under Program P3, 55 counties would be disconnected before the upgrade.
Program P4 imposes the additional constraint that no counties can be unprofitable (and potentially disconnected) before the upgrade. Under this set of policies, all counties would be upgraded, at a cost to the government 14 percent lower than the current program. Firm value would be nearly 30 percent higher than under the current program. Program P4 maintains the level of existing subsidies for areas that have not been upgraded. However, it limits the distribution losses that can be billed to unmetered households. This reduces the profitability of providing service in non-upgraded regions by an average of 40 percent. Importantly, it does not reduce profitability by so much that some areas would be unprofitable. In addition, the government provides a 75 percent subsidy towards the capital cost of the upgrade. This subsidy means that as long as the increase in profit from upgrading an area exceeds $1.41 per month, the firm would make the investment.
Note that precise implementation of Program P4 would be impossible in practice because the level of distribution losses between the shared meter and the dwelling is unobserved. As a practical alternative, the regulator could estimate an average loss amount as a function of the supply voltage at the meter location, and use this to set a quantity discount factor to apply to consumption measured at a shared meter.
These alternative policies demonstrate that it is possible for the government to do much better than the current subsidy program, in terms of the number of upgraded counties and the cost to the government, even taking account of political constraints from households and firms.
Conclusion
Approximately 40 percent of urban residents in developing countries live in informal settlements, characterized by insecurity of tenure, crowded living conditions, inadequate shelter, and low-quality services. 49 The provision of safe and reliable water, sanitation, and electricity services to these areas is a major challenge. But it is a challenge that must be met. Recent research in the economic development literature has shown how infrastructure improvements can have larger effects on social and economic outcomes that previously realized.
In this paper, I have shown how a policy that ostensibly helps poor households-the provision of subsidized utility service-can instead lock those households into low-quality service. Although the finding that subsidy provision can be distortionary will not be surprising to any economist, this paper describes a novel mechanism for the way in which subsidies affect investment decisions. For an electricity supplier serving households living in informal settlements in Colombia, the profits from government subsidies alone may be high enough that there is no incentive to invest in distribution networks in these neighborhoods, even if the investment leads to households paying for the service.
This result has broad implications for the design of policies, not just in Colombia, but in the many developing countries that provide subsidies for water and electricity. For countries in which these subsidy programs receive external financing from the government, rather than relying on internal cross-subsidies or transfers, there will be an incentive for firms to include as many users as possible within the program. If the households included in the program do not pay their bills, the subsidy becomes a direct transfer from the government to firms. Therefore the firm would have an incentive to extract higher subsidies for these households, for example, by selecting a favorable methodology to estimate the consumption of unmetered households.
By increasing the profitability of low-quality service in informal settlements, subsidy programs reduce the incentive for the firm to invest in an upgrade. If the subsidies are sufficiently large, the most profitable option for the firm would be to continue providing the low-quality service forever. This is a terrible outcome for the government, because it locks in both the high subsidy payments to firms and the low-quality service for households. In fact, the firm could even have an incentive to provide the lowest possible service quality. This can occur if revenue does not depend on quality, but variable costs are lower when consumption is reduced by lower service quality.
Government policy for utility services in informal settlements should have a single goal: the provision of a metered connection built to a high technical standard for all households. Providing subsidies for the consumption of households in informal settlements makes this goal much more difficult to achieve, because it reduces the incentive for firms to invest in upgrading service. An ideal policy to ensure that all households are provided with modern infrastructure would reduce or eliminate these subsidies, replacing them with partial funding of the costs of the upgrade and, if necessary, greater provision of subsidies to households or firms conditional on the upgrade.
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Consumption
Monthly metered electricity consumption, normalized to a standard billing cycle length by multiplying by 30/n where n is the number of days in the billing cycle.
Electricity price
Price schedule for metered households has three components: low price p L jt , high price p H jt , and subsidized quantity Q sub . The high price is calculated by dividing the billed amount before subsidies by consumption. The subsidized quantity is based on the table in Resolution 355 of 2004 by the Ministry of Mines and Energy; the exact cutoff between high and low altitude areas is determined for each firm by examining discontinuities in the implied subsidies. The subsidy percentage (and therefore the low price) is determined by dividing the subsidy amount in pesos by the minimum of consumption quantity and subsidized quantity.
Income
Monthly household expenditure in millions of Colombian pesos (1 million Colombian Pesos = 422 United States Dollars). Calculated as the midpoint of one of nine bins for a census question on the required level of monthly income for the household to adequately cover its basic expenses.
Outage hours
Reported total number of hours of outages for a month at the transformer serving the household, allocated pro rata to observations using the number of days in the month in each billing cycle.
Appliance variables
For each of 12 appliances, this is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the household reports ownership of that appliance.
Hh members
Total number of people in the household.
Rooms
Total number of rooms in the dwelling, excluding kitchen, bathroom and garage. Apartment
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the dwelling is an apartment. Temperature
Mean temperature in degrees Celsius for the household's billing cycle. This is calculated using daily mean temperature observations at 42 weather stations in Colombia, obtained from IDEAM (Instituto de Hidrología, Meteorología y Estudios Ambientales). The interpolated daily mean temperature for each household is the mean from the 42 weather stations, weighted by the inverse square of the distance between the household and each weather station, after adjusting all temperatures for the difference in altitude (using a temperature-altitude gradient of 5.54 degrees Celsius per 1000 meters).
Av. outages
Mean number of supply interruptions per month at the transformer serving the household, for the 12 months before the first month in the estimation sample. Av. outage hrs Mean number of hours of outages per month at the transformer serving the household, for the 12 months before the first month in the estimation sample.
Cooking fuel
Three indicator variables for the household's primary cooking fuel: electricity, piped natural gas, or propane gas cylinders. The excluded group is the use of alternative cooking fuels such as wood or charcoal. Continued on next page. Table 2 provides definitions for each of the variables used in estimation. c The table shows the results for the estimation of a single model. The parameter estimates in the appliance columns show the interaction between the appliance ownership indicator and the corresponding variable. d The omitted group is a Stratum 1 household in the northern coast region in January. e Parameter estimates for seven small appliances, eight geographical regions, and month-of-year dummies are not shown. These are not interacted with the appliance terms. a Price and income elasticities are computed from 50 draws of the and η for each observation in the sample, calculating the predicted change in consumption from a 1% increase in both price steps and a 1% increase in income, respectively. For the summary statistics, price elasticities are truncated at -2 and 0, and income elasticities are truncated at -1 and 2. b Outage effect shows the mean change in monthly electricity demand, in kWh, as a result of a one-hour supply outage. Consumption of Electricity Report. f The census question does not ask the source of energy for these appliances (may be gas or electric). g Consumption in this category is the residual after accounting for consumption by the listed appliances. Number of upgrades 1 20 0 0 0 a In scenario 'Mean+loss', the billed consumption for households before the upgrade is the mean predicted consumption for the households in each settlement, scaled up by the assumed pre-upgrade distribution losses. In scenario 'Av. Strat. 1', the billed consumption is based on the observed mean billed quantity for the households in the distribution firm's service territory in 2005. The third scenario 'Part pay' calculates billed consumption using the same method as 'Mean+loss', but with bill payment rates of 10 percent before the upgrade and 90 percent after the upgrade. b These columns show the calculation of upgrade profitability for two out of the 100 counties used in the analysis: the ones with the lowest and highest pre-upgrade per-user profit. Post-upgrade Profit ($/month) Government subsidies 6.11 6.11 6.11 6.88 6.11 User revenue 6.64 6.64 6.64 6.64 6.64 Variable costs -6.00 -6.00 -6.00 -6.00 -6.00 Total 6.75 6.75 6.75 7.52 6.75 Notes: For a fraction (1 − w) hours of the month with uninterrupted supply, the household can consume any quantity at the regulated price (left graphic). For the remaining fraction w of hours in the month, supply is interrupted and consumption is zero (middle graphic). Because random outages affect both high-value and low-value consumption, the supply-constrained demand is (1 − w)q * (p) (right graphic). Notes: Each letter refers to the rectangle defined by the dotted lines. Household demand before the upgrade is D 1 and households consume at D 1 (0) = q 1 . Because q 1 is unobserved, households are billed for the average consumption in their settlement including losses, q 1 /(1 − l 1 ). Revenue for the firm comes only from the government subsidy: area A + B + E + F + G + H. Profit for the firm is the area F + G + H.
After the upgrade, household demand is D 2 and households consume at D 2 (P f −s) = q 2 . Households are billed for their true consumption q 2 . Revenue for the firm comes from both the subsidy and payment by the household: area A + F + I. Costs for the firm including losses are A + B. Profit for the firm after the upgrade is the area F + I − B.
The firm will decide to invest in the upgrade if the change in profits is greater than the annualized capital cost of the upgrade. The change in profits is
where φ() and Φ() represent the standard normal pdf and cdf respectively. The derivation of the expression for the second term in equation (A.1) is similar. The third term in equation (A.1) is simpler because it requires the joint distribution of the two independent random variables, η jt and ε jt :
Equation (A.1) for the probability of observing q jt can now be rewritten in terms of the previous expressions involving the normal pdf and cdf: Note that in the likelihood function the expression for σ η jt depends on the appliance holdings of household j, as shown in equation (2.5).
B Analysis of Distribution Upgrades
In this appendix, I provide additional details for the model of the combined retail and distribution firms and how their profit is determined from the household demand for electricity and the price and subsidy parameters set by the government. I also provide details of the computation of the profitability of network upgrades. As described in Section 1, for residential customers, the combined distribution and retail firms are monopolists within their distribution areas. Price schedules are set by the government and the cost of wholesale electricity purchases is passed through, with a lag, into these prices. The retailing and distribution costs are assumed to be fixed. The decision considered in this paper is the choice to upgrade the distribution infrastructure for a small geographical area such as a neighborhood or village.
Firms bill each of their customers for a consumption quantityq jt . For households with upgraded connections that include a meter, the billed amount corresponds to actual consumption:q jt = q jt . For households with the low-quality, unmetered connections, it is impossible to measure true consumption. As described in Section 1, the electricity sector regulations contain several procedures that can be used to compute the consumption for the unmetered household's bill. The firm can use a communal meter to measure the total amount of electricity flowing into a settlement, and then assign this equally to each household. This means that households are billed not only for the average consumption, but also for the average losses between the meter and the dwelling. An alternative method for computing the bill is to use the average billed consumption for all households in the same stratum in the distribution firm's service territory. I show results for both methods of determing the pre-upgrade billed quantity.
Revenue for the firm is the sum of subsidy transfers from the government and bill payments by households, both of which depend on the quantity that the firm bills to the household,q jt . Figure 5 shows the general price schedule for households in informal settlements, including both the regular Stratum 1 subsidy and the Social Energy subsidy. s L includes both the 50 percent Stratum 1 subsidy and the 2 cents/kWh Social Energy subsidy, while s H is only the Social Energy subsidy. Because there is no cap on the consumption quantity for the Social Energy subsidy, consumption above Q sub is billed for less than P f t .
As shown in Figure 5 , if the household pays their bill, then the firm receives the base price P f t for the entire billed consumption, so that the firm's revenue is the area A+B +E +F +G. In the case of non-payment by the household, the firm receives only the subsidy transfer: A + E for the first Q sub units billed, and B for subsequent units. Revenue for the firm from household j in period t is given by equation (B.1). 50
Rev jt = Pay jt P f tqjt + max 0, (1 − Pay jt )((s L − s H ) min (q jt , Q sub ) + s Hqjt )P f t (B.1) Pay jt is equal to 1 if household j pays their bill for period t, and 0 otherwise. Figure 5 illustrates the important asymmetry between paying and non-paying cases. If the household pays its bill each month, the size of the subsidy has no direct effect on the firm's revenue and profit: a larger subsidy means that the government pays more but the household pays less, so that the firm's total revenue remains constant. 51 However, this is not true for non-paying households. For non-payers, the only revenue for the firm is the fiscal transfer to cover the subsidy component of the unpaid bill. Unlike the case of the paying user, an extra dollar of subsidy provided for a non-paying household results in an extra dollar of revenue (and profit) for the firm. Therefore the firm has an incentive to increase the value of the subsidy for non-paying households, such as by lobbying the government to expand the subsidy program for these users, or by optimally choosing the calculation method ofq jt for unmetered households.
The major cost for the firm is the variable cost of the electricity used by the household, which the firm is required to buy from the wholesale market at a price c f t per unit. Electrical line losses mean that if the firm pays for 1 unit of electricity at the entry point to its network, only (1 − l jt ) units would reach household j. Equivalently, if household j consumes q jt units in period t, the firm will pay for q jt 1−l jt units. The size of the line losses l jt may be reduced as the firm upgrades its network.
The expression for the customer-level profit excludes fixed costs, such as maintenance and administrative expenses. These do not vary with the level of the customer's consumption and are assumed not to change as a result of upgrading a customer's connection.
The firm's profit for customer j, before fixed and capital costs, is given by equation (B.2).
Investment in the network upgrade affects the firm's profits through five channels. First, the 50 s L is negative for the households in Strata 5 and 6 who pay more than P f t for their electricity consumption to partially fund the subsidies for the poorer households. The firm still receives P f tqjt if the household pays, since the contribution is returned to the government. However, if the household does not pay, the firm's revenue is zero rather than negative: the firm does not have to fund the household's contribution in the event of non-payment. 51 However, as shown by the estimates from the structural model of household demand, the subsidy has an indirect effect on revenue from paying users, through the quantity demanded by the household. installation of meters enables monitoring of the consumption of individual households, so that the billed amountq jt corresponds to actual consumption q jt . Second, the "normalization" of services reduces the size of the subsidy if the subsidy is conditional on the household having low-quality infrastructure. 52 Third, the installation of individual metered connections increases the ability of the firm to enforce payment by end users, so that Pay jt is more likely to be 1 rather than 0. 53 Fourth, the improved infrastructure reduces the number of outages and so increases demand for most households by the results in Section 2. Finally, the improvements to the distribution network reduce the amount of electrical line losses, l jt .
The firm makes its decision whether to upgrade the network supplying customer j's neighborhood by comparing Π jt with the existing low-quality infrastructure to the value of Π jt with the upgraded network. If the increase in profit exceeds the firm's required rate of return on the capital cost of the upgrade, then the upgrade would take place. Otherwise, the firm would maintain its existing low level of service.
For the analysis of the decision to upgrade informal distribution networks, I selected a sample of households that are representative of those living in areas with low-quality electricity supply. I chose the 100 counties in Colombia with the most hours of outage during 2005. 54 The minimum level of outages of the 100 counties in the sample is 29 outage hours per month, or slightly less than one hour per day, averaged across all electricity users in the county.
The firm's decision to upgrade an informal distribution network will typically be made at the level of a group of adjoining neighborhoods. For example, in the PRONE data for upgrades funded by the government, the median number of households for each project is 359. I approximate this level of decision making by using Stratum 1 households in the 52 As mentioned in Section 1, the Social Energy subsidy is provided to households in informal settlements, which are defined as areas that obtain electricity through unauthorized connections to the distribution network. Upgrading the infrastructure in the informal settlement may result in the loss of eligibility for this subsidy transfer. 53 In general, the upgrade provides the firm with the ability to disconnect a non-paying household. Rojas and Lallement (2007) discuss technologies that are being developed in Brazil and South Africa in order to facilitate payment enforcement. These include the use of prepaid meters, combined with the shortening of the low voltage distribution network and the installation of small transformers for each customer, possibly even incorporated into the meter. Any attempt to bypass the meter would result in damage to electrical appliances.
54 For each of the 495,000 service transformers in the data, I calculated the monthly mean outage hours and the monthly mean number of outages in 2005. In the ArcMap software I used the transformer coordinates to match each transformer to the county in which it is located. Next, for each of the 860 counties which are connected to the national transmission network and for which I have 2005 transformer data, I calculated the monthly mean outage hours as the weighted average of the transformer-level mean outage hours, where the weights are the number of users connected to each transformer. I rank the 860 counties by the outage hours and use the 100 counties with the greatest outage duration. Counties with less than 50 electricity users were excluded. urban areas of small counties in Colombia. Typically each county has a single urban center surrounded by rural areas that may contain smaller settlements. The median number of Stratum 1 households in the 100 counties in the sample is 1067. 55 For the counties in the sample I extracted dwelling and household characteristics from the 2005 long-form Census, selecting a random sample of 250 households for each of the 100 counties. I assigned each household to a stratum based on household characteristics and the county-level proportions of households in each stratum. The analysis is based on those households assigned to Stratum 1. 56 Retail prices and wholesale costs for each county, for each month of 2005, were obtained from CREG. 57 With this data set, I used the demand parameters described in Section 2 to simulate monthly household-level consumption for 2005 under two scenarios. First, I assumed that the households were unmetered, that they faced the county-level mean number and duration of outages, and that they did not pay for their consumption of electricity. This scenario corresponds to the situation of households living in informal settlements. Second, I assumed that the households received an upgrade that reduced their outages by 75 percent, that a meter was installed, and that the household began paying their electricity bill. Although the analysis is hypothetical-I do not know which of the households in the sample are unmetered and non-paying-it is likely that the households in the sample have similar characteristics to those living in informal settlements.
Consumption before and after the upgrade is predicted as follows. First, for each household in the data, I draw 50 values of ε jt and η jt from the estimated distribution of these unobservables. The distribution of η jt depends on the appliance holdings of household j. For each of these 50 draws of ε jt and η jt , I use the estimated demand parameters and the observable characteristics of the household to calculate electricity consumption before the upgrade, based on equation (2.3). The calculation of consumption before the upgrade assumes a price of zero and the county-level mean number and duration of outages. The predicted consump-tion quantity before the upgrade is the mean of these 50 calculated values. Next, I use the same 50 draws of ε jt and η jt to calculate electricity consumption after the upgrade, with the lower duration of outages and the regulated price schedule. The predicted consumption quantity after the upgrade is the mean of these 50 calculated values. I assume that the improvement in reliability from the upgrade only affects contemporaneous outages and not the historical outage averages. Table 7 includes a summary of the results for an alternative specification in which the historical averages also change.
Using these predictions for consumption before and after the upgrade, I then use equation (B.2) to calculate the firm's monthly profit before and after the upgrade for each household in the sample. These were aggregated to the county level to give the mean change in profit as a result of the upgrade for each county. If the incremental change in profit as a result of the investment exceeds the monthly capital cost of the upgrade, based on an annual cost of capital of 13.4 percent, then the upgrade will be profitable for the firm and the firm will be willing to make the investment. 58 Otherwise, the firm will prefer not to upgrade and instead continue supplying non-paying, unmetered customers in informal settlements. 59 58 The cost of capital used is the real, pre-tax weighted average cost of capital for electricity distribution activities in Colombia that are subject to a price cap, as calculated by the regulator for 2008 (CREG, "Costo de Capital para Remunerar la Actividad de Distribución de Energía Eléctrica", Document CREG-001, Jan 17, 2008). Assumptions in their calculation include a debt/equity ratio of 66 percent, an unlevered beta of 0.58, a market risk premium of 7.13 percent, and a country risk premium of 3.38 percent.
59 Parameter assumptions for the calculation of the firm's profit are as follows. The firm receives the Social Energy Fund subsidy of 2 cents/kWh for the amountq. Distribution losses after the upgrade are assumed to be 17.3 percent, the level of losses incorporated into the regulatory price schedules in December 2005. Before the upgrade distribution losses are assumed to be twice that amount: 34.6 percent. As a robustness check, in Table 7 I show the results based on the assumption that the pre-upgrade losses are only 50 percent higher. The cost of the upgrade is assumed to be US$510 per household. This is the mean upgrade cost per household for 99 network normalization projects submitted to PRONE (data from the Ministry of Mines and Energy). 67 percent of the projects have a cost per household within 20 percent of $510. 
